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SYMPOSIUM ADDRESS
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH
CAROLINA
THE HON. JAMEs G. EXUM, JR.*
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dean Davis, members of the
faculty, students, my fellow speakers on the platform and guests. I
appreciatethe opportunity to be here on this Good Friday and talk
on the subject of the death penalty, as difficult a subject as it is.
Indeed, for me, it is probably the most difficult subject I have to
deal with in my job.
Let me start by saying that ordinarily judges do not express
personal views on matters that regularly come before them. The
reason is that in most cases, judges' personal views are irrelevant,
except of course in those areas where the law leaves room for the
exercise of value judgments of the court. It is the judge's solemn,
and sometimes difficult duty to apply the law as the judge deter-
mines it to be to the facts in order to arrive at a decision. This
duty is not in the least tempered because the judge may personally
disagree with the law he determines must be applied. In exercising
* Associate Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court since 1975 and
chairman of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Death Pen-
alty Cost Study Committee. A.B., University of North Carolina of Chapel Hill,
LL.B, New York University School of Law. Former member, North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly and superior court judge in Guilford County.
The text of this article is derived from an address given at the John J. Brod-
erick Civil Rights Symposium presented by the Campbell University Law Stu-
dents Civil Rights Research Council on April 5, 1985.
Robin L. Fornes and Steve Phillips assisted Justice Exum in the research for
this article and prepared the footnotes. Joseph F. Lyles compiled the charts on
cases in North Carolina involving the death penalty.
1
Exum: Symposium Address: The Death Penalty in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
that most delicate of all judicial functions, that is, determining
whether legislation comports with the Constitution, it is not un-
common in our reported cases to see judges express personal views
of the legislation and indeed say on occasion what they might do if
they were legislators. But in the next breath they proceed to lay
aside these views and proceed with what appears to be an objective
assessment of whether the legislation meets constitutional require-
ments as the Constitution is understood by the judges.
In Furman v. Georgia,' a five to four majority of the United
States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional death penalty
statutes in the states of Georgia and Texas. Two of the five, Justice
Brennan2 and Justice Marshall, 3 concluded that the death penalty
was cruel and unusual per se and could not be carried out under
any circumstances. Two others, Justice Stewart4 and Justice
White, 5 took the position that the particular statutes were uncon-
stitutional because they delegated unbridled authority to judges or
juries to impose death in such a way as to provide "no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not."' The other member of the
quintet, Justice Douglas,7 felt the statutes in question were "preg-
nant with discrimination." 8 Of the four dissenting justices, both
Chief Justice Burger 9 and Justice Blackmun 10 expressed a personal
dislike for the death penalty. Both indicated that if they had legis-
lative power they would join Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall.
.Chief Justice Burger added the caveat that he would "at the very
least restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of
the most heinous crimes."" Justice Blackmun wrote that death
cases "provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to
no one in the depth of my . . . abhorrence for the death penalty,
• ..buttressed by a believe that capital punishment serves no use-
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 313.
7. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 257.
9. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 375.
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ful purpose that can be demonstrated. '1 2 Yet, both Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun went on to conclude that the death
penalty was not unconstitutional. They were not authorized, they
felt, as judges, to permit their personal views about it to intrude on
the question of whether the Constitution permitted it.' 3
My position is much like that of Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Blackmun. I voted against the death penalty as a member of
the North Carolina Legislature in 1967. I would do so again today
if I were a member of that body. But, I did not believe then, and
do not believe now that the death penalty is unconstitutional; al-
though I think some interesting new arguments relying on the
right to privacy and life and the due process clause are being made
with reference to its constitutionality." The North Carolina Con-
stitution expressly provides for the death penalty.' 5 So our state
court could not rely on that document to invalidate the death
penalty.
I am satisfied furthermore that a substantial majority of our
people desire the death penalty as an instrument of criminal jus-
tice. This desire on the part of the people and the intensity with
which it is held has been emphatically demonstrated in at least
two states, California and Massachusetts. The supreme courts of
those states declared the death penalty unconstitutional under
their state constitutions. 6 The people in both states promptly
amended their constitutions to reinstate it.'7 According to the
American Bar Journal, a February 1985 Gallup Poll reported that
seventy-two percent of Americans favor the death penalty for mur-
der. Twenty years ago only forty-five percent favored it.' 8
12. Id. at 405.
13. Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 375-76 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
14. See Smith, The Death Penalty As An Unconstitutional Deprivation of
Life and the Right to Privacy, 25 B.C.L. REv. 743 (1984).
15. 10 N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2. "The object of punishment being not only to
satisfy justice, but also to reform the offender and thus prevent crime, murder,
arson, burglary, and rape, and these only, may be punishable with death, if the
General Assembly shall so enact." Id.
16. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 339 N.E.2d
676 (1975).
17. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (amended 1972); MASS. CONST. art. 26 (amended
1982).
18. 11 A.BA. J., April, 1985, vol. 71 p. 44. Sixty-eight percent of the lawyers
polled were in favor of the death penalty being carried out when imposed by the
1985]
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The up-shot is that notwithstanding my personal views, my
duty as judge to be faithful to the office and to my oath is to en-
force this law. To date, my personal beliefs about it have not been
so strong that my conscience has been unbearably disturbed on oc-
casions when I have had to vote to sustain a death sentence. If my
personal feelings about the death penalty ever become so strong
that I cannot find it in my conscience to vote to apply the law in a
case in which it is legally called for, then I will resign. My views on
the death penalty were set out in somewhat more detail in a con-
curring opinion in State v. Woodson in 1975.19 I wrote then:
I am personally opposed to capital punishment. Maintaining
it, even for murder, is not in my view wise public policy.
My belief that capital punishment is unwise as a matter of
public policy is based primarily on the proposition that govern-
ment, if it functions properly, should seek to set an example, to
teach the people whom it serves. People ought to be able to look
to the basic underlying policies of government and see there what
is inherently right and proper. I agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis
who once wrote: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 72 L.Ed.
944, 959, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928). The cold, calculated, premeditated
taking of human life is an act the brutality and violence of which
is not diminished because it is sponsored by the state. We rightly
abhor the kind of human being who commits such an act. That
the state should respond in kind is, to me, equally abhorrent. The
argument that we somehow exalt human life by executing those
wretches who murder and rape falls of its own weight. Calculated
killings by individuals without doubt cheapen the God-given right
to live. So, however, do calculated executions at the hands of the
state. Executions are bad examples; they teach, not respect for
life, but that some lives are not worth maintaining. It is a short
step in the minds of many from execution at the hands of the
state to murder and other violence at the hands of the people.2 0
What I want to talk with you about tonight is how the death
penalty is working in North Carolina. First, a word about the his-
tory of our present statute. In the wake of Furman, this state ini-
tially reacted by providing for a mandatory death sentence for all
courts. Id.
19. 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975).
20. Id. at 597-98, 215 S.E.2d at 619.
[Vol. 8:1
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/1
DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA
capital crimes: at that time, first degree murder and first degree
rape. This was accomplished first by judicial decision2' and later
by legislation. 22 The legislation was declared unconstitutional in
Woodson v. North Carolina.2 3 Our Legislature reacted to that deci-
sion by enacting the present death penalty statute,24 which is
modeled in large part on similar provisions in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code.2"
Our statute provides for a bifurcated proceeding in a capital
case. Upon conviction of first degree murder, now our only capital
crime, a separate sentencing hearing is conducted before a jury,
which may be the same jury that heard the guilt phase of the case.
The statute provides that the jury may consider specified aggravat-
ing and specified mitigating circumstances together with "any
other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems
to have mitigating value. '26 Whatever aggravating or mitigating
circumstances are considered must be supported by evidence of-
fered either at the guilt or the sentencing phase.
In order to "recommend" death-the jury's so-called "recom-
mendation" is binding on the court-the jury must return a writ-
ten verdict directed to three crucial inquiries. The written verdict
must show first there are aggravating circumstances, one or more,
which the jury finds to exist beyond a reasonable doubt; second,
the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggra-
vating; and third, the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently
substantial to call for the death penalty when considered with the
mitigating circumstances found.27
Sentences of death are reviewed directly by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court. The court is required by statute to overturn a
death sentence and impose life imprisonment if it concludes either
that no aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence
or "that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or upon a finding
that the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the
21. State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 18 (1973).
22. 1973 N.C. SESS. LAWS 1201, ratified April 8, 1974, codified as N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (1981).
23. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9).
27. Id. at § 15A-2000(c); State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 32-33, 301 S.E.2d
308, 327 (1983).
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penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and
the defendant.""8 This latter inquiry is sometimes referred to as
our duty to conduct a "proportionality review."
I am satisfied this statute comports with the United States Su-
preme Court's Furman and Woodson decisions which require that
a death penalty statute not permit "unbridled jury discretion in
the imposition of capital sentences," but must on the contrary, "al-
low the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant before the impo-
sition" of a death sentence.29
How has the statute been working in North Carolina? To
date, 0 one hundred nineteen cases in which the jury determined
whether to impose death or life imprisonment have been tried
under the new death penalty statute and reviewed by our court. Of
these one hundred nineteen, juries recommended death in forty-
eight." In these forty-eight, the court has affirmed the death sen-
tence in twenty-three.32 Four were given new trials on the issue of
guilt. 33 Fourteen were given new sentencing hearings for error in
the sentencing phase of the case.3 Three were reduced to life im-
prisonment because of the insufficiency of the evidence to support
any aggravating circumstances.35 Four were reduced to life because
the court concluded that death was excessive and disproportionate
in the particular case at bar.36 And one was reduced to life because
the court concluded that the evidence would not support a first
degree murder conviction, but would support only a conviction for
accessory before the fact to murder for which the maximum pen-
alty was life.3 7
No accurate figures are presently available on whether the
fourteen cases that were remanded for new sentencing hearings or
for new trials ultimately concluded with a death sentence or life
28. Id. at § 15A-2000(d)(2).
29. 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976)
30. The following statistical data was compiled as of March 1, 1986.
31. See Chart A, Appendix.
32. Id. at disposition column.
33. Id. at G, Legend column.
34. Id. at S, Legend column. Actually, only eleven defendants' sentences have
been remanded. However, defendants Moore and Oliver have each had their
sentences remanded on more than one occasion.
35. Id. at I, Legend column.
36. Id. at E, Legend column.
37. Id. at N, Legend column.
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imprisonment. According to some unofficial information which I
have received from the clerks' offices throughout the state, I think
it's fairly accurate to say that only two or three of these cases re-
sulted in death sentences on remand. Most resulted in life
imprisonment.
The thirty-one cases in which the jury recommended death
and which were finally disposed of on appeal come from twenty-
two different counties in the state.38 Cabarrus County has three,
while Edgecombe, Gaston, Mecklenburg, New Hanover, Robeson,
Surry, and Union have two each. The other counties represented
have only one. Of these cases, thirty defendants were men, only
one was a woman. Seventeen defendants were white, one was an
Indian, thirteen were black.39 Sixteen were over thirty years old,
and fifteen were under thirty; the youngest was nineteen.4" Only
two people have been executed in North Carolina.4' Both were
white. One was a man, Robert Hutchins; the other, Thelma
Barfield, a woman.
Certain patterns seem to be developing in the way juries are
deciding whether to impose capital punishment. Of the aggravating
factors specified in the death penalty statute, the most important
ones seem to be: first, whether the murder "was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; ' 42 second, whether the murder was "committed
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest,"'3 i.e. the
witness elimination kind of murder; third, whether the murder was
"part of a course of conduct. . . which included the commission
by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another per-
son or persons;" and fourth, whether the defendant had been
convicted of prior crimes of violence against persons.45 Of the
death verdicts reviewed by the court, almost all involve one or
more of these four aggravating factors. We have reviewed, I be-
lieve, only one death case, State v. Hill, cited and discussed herein
below, in which at least one of these factors was not present. In
Hill the court set aside the death penalty on proportionality
grounds.
38. Id. at Trial column.
39. Id. at Race column.
40. Id. at Age column
41. Id. at Disposition column.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1983). See also Chart B, Appendix.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (1983).
44. Id. at (e)(11).
45. Id. at (e)(3).
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Of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute,
the most important seem to be whether the murder "was commit-
ted while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emo-
tional disturbance, ' and whether "[t]he capacity of the defend-
ant to appreciate the criminalty of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired. 47 Of the death
verdicts reviewed by the court, rarely have juries recommended
death where one or more of these mitigating factors were present,
and in only one case has the jury recommended death where both
were present. 8
Our court is keenly aware of the heavy responsibility imposed
upon it in reviewing death verdicts. All of us on the court consider
it an awesome responsibility and we approach it with great care.
Indeed, in order to help us conduct our proportionality review, we
recently placed death cases in a computer data base, so that we
can recall them fairly easily according to various criteria having to
do with mitigating and aggravating circumstances present in the
case and certain other facts and circumstances which we feel are
most relevant.49
In conducting our proportionality review, the court compares
the case at bar with all other capital cases which have been "re-
viewed on direct appeal and in which the jury recommended death
or life imprisonment or in which the trial court imposed life im-
prisonment after the jury's failure to agree upon a sentencing rec-
ommendation within a reasonable period of time."8 0 The court has
said:
[O]ur task on proportionality review is to compare the case at bar
with other cases in the pool which are roughly similar with regard
to the crime and the defendant, such as, for example, the manner
in which the crime was committed, and defendant's character,
background, and physical and mental condition. If, after making
such a comparison, we find that juries have consistently been re-
turning death sentences in the similar cases, then we will have a
46. Id. at (f)(2); see also Chart C, Appendix.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1983).
48. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983). This does not
include those cases in which these mitigating factors are deemed to have been
found by the jury for purposes of the proportionality pool. See State v. Douglas
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983).
49. For a compilation of those cases which are utilized in the court's propor-
tionality review, see Chart D, Appendix.
50. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355 (1984).
[Vol. 8:1
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strong basis for concluding that a death sentence in the case
under review is not excessive or disproportionate. On the other
hand if we find that the juries have consistently been returning
life sentences in the similar cases, we will have a strong basis for
concluding that a death sentence in the case under review is ex-
cessive or disproportionate. 1
To show how our proportionality review is working more spe-
cifically, let us look at State v. Hill,52 recently decided, in which
the court considered the shooting of a policeman under circum-
stances in which there was little evidence of premeditation and de-
liberation. A majority of the court concluded there was enough evi-
dence to get to the jury on that point, the jury having answered it
against defendant and recommended death. The killing occurred
when the officer observed the defendant under suspicious circum-
stances in the early morning hours near a business establishment.
The defendant ran and the officer gave chase. The officer tackled
the defendant and during the struggle the defendant extricated
himself and shot the officer to death.
The only aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that
the murder was committed against a law enforcement officer while
in the performance of his official duty. A majority of the court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Branch, compared this case with other
cases in the pool, and particularly to the only other two killings of
law enforcement officers that we had reviewed. 3 In the first of
these two cases, Hutchins, the jury recommended death. And in
the other case, Abdullah, the jury recommended life. The court
concluded that the disparity of sentences in these two cases ren-
dered "any meaningful comparison in this limited pool virtually
impossible."
It went on, however, to compare the case with other cases in
the pool in which the death penalty had been affirmed. It con-
cluded that this murder, unlike other murders in which the court
had affirmed the death penalty, was not especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel, not over-tortuous, sadistic, or of a blood-thirsty na-
ture, nor a part of a violent course of conduct. Furthermore, it was
not committed in the perpetration of another felony. And finally,
there was no evidence that the defendant coldly calculated or
51. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E2d 493, 503 (1984).
52. 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984).
53. State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981); State v. Abdullah,
309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983).
19851
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planned the crime. The court said that death was a disproportion-
ate sentence and remanded for the imposition of life
imprisonment.
On the other hand, in State v. Lawson, 4 an opinion which I
authored, we concluded that death was not disproportionate. De-
fendant Lawson had been caught burglarizing a private dwelling by
the owner. He ordered the owner to turn around, whereupon Law-
son shot him fatally in the back of the head. When Lawson ran
from the house, he encountered the owner's father approaching the
house. Lawson ordered the father at gunpoint to walk to the rear
of the house where he also shot the father in the back of the head.
The father miraculously survived.
Lawson made a statement, admitted against him at his trial,
that he had tried to kill the victims in order to eliminate witnesses
to his crime because he did not want to go back to prison. At his
sentencing hearing, he told the jury that if they believed he com-
mitted these acts "[g]as me. I'd like the death penalty." He offered
little in mitigation of the murder.
The aggravating circumstances found in Lawson were that the
murder was committed to avoid arrest and was part of conduct
which involved violence against another person. The court found
no legal error in either phase of the trial. It is only when we find no
legal error in both phases that we reach our proportionality review.
We noted that "the course of conduct" aggravating circumstance
was common to about half of the cases in which a death sentence
had been affirmed. Furthermore, it was present in only one of a
large number of robbery-murder cases in which juries had imposed
life.55 In that case the jury found the diminished capacity and emo-
tional disturbance of the defendant to be mitigating factors. The
court concluded:
Because juries have returned death sentences in a number of
cases similar to this one and the cases in which juries have re-
turned life imprisonment are for the most part distinguishable on
the basis of the absence of an aggravating factor present in this
case or the presence of mitigating factors absent in this case, we
conclude that the sentence of death in the case is not excessive or
disproportionate. ..
I have dissented in a number of death cases. Most of my dis-
54. 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
55. State v. Barnette, 307 N.C. 608, 300 S.E.2d 340 (1983).
56. Id. at 651-52, 314 S.E.2d at 505.
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sents arose from my disagreement with the majority's application
of legal principles, on which we all agreed, to the facts in the par-
ticular case.5 In three instances, however, I feel the majority has
made unfortunate decisions regarding the appropriate legal princi-
ples to apply in a capital case.
First, a majority of our court determined that it did not de-
prive a capital defendant of his right to have a fair cross-section of
the community represented on the jury in the guilt phase of the
case when the state removed from that jury all Witherspoon dis-
qualified jurors58Sin other words, jurors who could not under any
circumstance vote to impose the death penalty. While I agree that
such jurors ought not to sit on the penalty phase of the case, I see
no reason not to permit them to sit on the guilt phase, provided
they are able to decide the question of guilt without reference to
their beliefs which would keep them from imposing the death
sentence.59
Second, I disagreed with the majority when it held that the
jury need not specify which of several mitigating circumstances it
found to exist.60 In order for us properly to conduct our propor-
tionality review, I think it important to know in a given case,
which mitigating circumstances the jury found and which it did
not.61 Not requiring the jury to be as specific and concise about the
mitigating circumstances as it is about the aggravating encourages
the jury to be less attentive to the mitigating circumstances and
"probably violates a capital defendant's constitutional right to 'in-
57. See e.g. State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 436, 319 S.E.2d 189, 207 (1984);
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Hufstetler, 312 N.C.
92, 119, 322 S.E 2d 110, 127 (1984); State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 464, 302 S.E.2d
740, 751 (1983); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 225, 302 S.E. 2d 144, 160 (1983);
State v. McDowell, 308 N.C. 1, 38, 301 S.E.2d 308, 330 (1983); State v. Johnson,
298 N.C. 355, 378, 259 S.E.2d 752, 766 (1979).
58. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C 1, 38, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230 (1982); State v. Wil-
liams, 305 N.C. 656, 691, 292 S.E.2d 243, 264 (1982). See also Spinkellink v.
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); Peo-
ple v. Sand, 81 Cal. App. 3d 448, 146 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980); State v. Cherry,
298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). But see
Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983)
59. My views on this question are fully set out in my dissenting opinion in
State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980).
60. State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 25, 320 S.E.2d 642, 657 (1984); State v. Rook,
304 N.C. 201, 237, 283 S.E.2d 732, 754 (1981); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 292,
283 S.E.2d 761, 787 (1981).
61. See Appendix, Chart C.
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dividualized consideration' " as that concept was expounded in
Lockett v. Ohio62 by Chief Justice Burger.6 3
Finally, I disagreed with the majority when it held that if a
jury answers the three crucial issues submitted to it in a death case
favorably to the state, it has a duty to return a death sentence.64
My view is that while these findings are a prerequisite to a death
verdict, the findings, if made, do not compel such a verdict. A jury
for reasons best known to itself and which it often may not be able
to articulate, ought always be permitted, it seems to me, to decide
in favor of life, provided it has properly considered the circum-
stances and the questions which the statute requires it to consider.
In at least two of our cases before this decision, jurors had done
just that. They had answered all of the crucial issues favorable to
the state, yet still recommended life. 6
I made inquiries to two people in our state who know a great
deal about our death penalty. I asked them to give me opinions on
how they felt it was working. Ms. Joan Byers,"6 who frequently ar-
gues death cases for the state in our court, and Mr. Adam Stein,
who was the first director of the Office of the Appellate Defender, 7
graciously responded. Ms. Byers said:
62. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
63. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 241, 283 S.E.2d 732, 756 (1981) (Exum, J.,
dissenting). Judge Dickson Phillips on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
concluded this procedure does violate the federal constitution. Rook v. Rice, No.
85-4004, slip op. (4th Cir. 1986) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
64. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 38, 301 S.E.2d 308, 330 (1983); State v.
Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 186, 293 S.E.2d 569, 591 (1982). State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1,
38, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 712, 292 S.E.2d 264,
277 (1982); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 691, 292 S.E.2d 243, 264 (1982). My
views on this issue are fully set out in State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at
230.
65. State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980); State v. Taylor, 298
N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979).
66. Ms. Byers was recently appointed Special Deputy Attorney General in
charge of the Appellate Section. She did her undergraduate work at Emory Uni-
versity and she received her J.D. from Duke University School of Law. Ms. Byers
started with state government in 1975 where she worked in the Education and
Correction Section. In 1976, she moved to the Special Prosecutor's Section of the
Attorney General's Office. In 1985 she was appointed Chairman of the Govern-
ment Appellate Section for Capital Cases. Ms. Byers has tried six capital cases.
67. Mr. Stein worked with that office from 1981 to 1985. He recieved his un-
dergraduate degree from New York University in 1964 and his J.D. degree from
George Washington University in 1967. Mr. Stein is presently in private practice
in the firm of Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, and Adkins, P.A.
[Vol. 8:1
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The officials charged by law with the responsibility of carrying
out the procedure [in the death cases] from arrest to execution so
far have behaved in a responsible manner. Decisions to try a case
as a capital one are not being made haphazardly. Far from being
eager to push questionable cases in which the death penalty is a
possibility, most prosecutors will do it only where both guilt and
at least one aggravating circumstance are obvious. When a capital
trial is contemplated there will be no serious issue as to guilt.
Some continue to attach much importance to the comparative
effectiveness of the prosecutor on the one hand and the defense
lawyer on the other as bearing on the result in a capital case. Ms.
Byers disagrees. She says: "The facts, not the lawyer, make the
difference. Some of the most skilled and prominent lawyers have
had clients sentenced to death."
On the other hand, Mr. Stein said that the system by which
we prosecute capital cases in North Carolina is arbitrary and
"stained with racism." He said "two-thirds of the people on death
row are black. No fancy analysis can explain that fact away for
me." He conceded, "[s]ome, after reviewing murder cases decided
by the North Carolina Supreme Court, conclude that the system
selects only the worst offenders to die and sends the less deserving
of the ultimate penalty to prison and that the system in that sense
is rational, not arbitrary." Mr. Stein does not agree with that pro-
position. He contends that if you examine all cases tried under the
new death penalty statute, many of which do not reach our court, a
different picture emerges. He argues "a defendant whose only real
goal at trial is a life sentence and who receives a life sentence, does
not appeal. Those tend to be among the most aggravated of the
death eligible cases, often worse than any sentenced to die. They
are not part of the data reviewed in the North Carolina Supreme
Court." Finally, Mr. Stein believes that the relative performances
of the competing attorneys and the resources they have been able
to muster do have an important effect on the outcome of a death
case.
From my point of view, which is admittedly based only on the
cases that our court has reviewed because they are the only ones I
know about, I must disagree with Mr. Stein's assessment. Mind
you, I do not speak in defense of the death penalty. It does seem to
me, however, from the cases which have reached our court, that
our state system for imposing it is operating with about as much
human rationality as one can expect and with adequate legal safe-
guards. The system is not perfect. There have been aberrations, as
1985]
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Mr. Stein points out, at least on the side of mercy. The cases in
which the court has sustained death verdicts have been those in-
volving the worst kind of murders or the worst kind of offenders,
or both.
Mr. Stein's statements call into question how one goes about
evaluating a criminal justice system in terms of its rationality in
imposing the death penalty. What data do you rely on? Mr. Stein
wants to look at all of the cases that have been processed by the
system, not just those that have been reviewed by the supreme
court. He complains about aberrations in some of the cases at the
trial level which resulted in life imprisonment, and which therefore
sometimes do not get to us. My impression is that many life cases
are reviewed by us. After all, life imprisonment is an extremely
severe penalty in and of itself. We review a great number of death-
eligible cases which resulted in life imprisonment, as I have indi-
cated. In any event, aberrations in favor of life are not cause for
concern. The real concern is that the system not allow any aberra-
tions in favor of death.
Now let me conclude, and I think appropriately on this Good
Friday and at this Christian institution, by saying that my faith as
a Christian pulls me in two directions when I consider my duty
with reference to capital cases. On the one hand it teaches me that
death may not in all circumstances be worse than life; that death is
not the end but may be the beginning of a new and better exis-
tence; and even the worst of criminals are redeemable by the grace
of God and may enter into that better existence. On the other
hand, partly because of my faith, I find it difficult to accept that it
is given to human beings to decide when and when not other
human beings should die. To paraphrase Professor Charles Black, 8
who has written eloquently in this area, perhaps only God's justice
is fit to make these decisions; the world's justice is not and never
can be. But until our people accept this, it is the duty of the crimi-
nal justice system to enforce our capital punishment laws which
the people have demanded with as much fairness and as much ra-
tionality and with as many reasonable safeguards as we can hu-
manly devise. I believe our system in North Carolina is genuinely
striving for this goal. Nevertheless, I hope, someday, the people
68. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Professor Black has written:
"[t]hough the justice of God may indeed ordain that some should die, the justice
of man is altogether and always insufficient for saying who these may be." BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 107 (2d ed. 1978).
[Vol. 8:1
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will come, as I do, to agree with Professor Black and, through their
elected representatives, choose to abolish the death penalty
altogether.
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Chart D
The following is a list of the cases comprising the pool for pro-
portionality review pursuant to the criteria established in State v.
Douglas Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983). State v. Wil-
liams, 315 N.C. 310, 338 S.E.2d 75 (1986); State v. Fields, 315 N.C.
191, 337 S.E.2d 518 (1986); State v. Willie Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 337
S.E.2d 808 (1985); State v. Westmoreland, 314 N.C. 442, 334
S.E.2d 223 (1985); State v. Spangler, 314 N.C. 374, 333 S.E.2d 722
(1985); State v. Hayes, Flowers, and Roberts, 314 N.C. 460, 334
S.E.2d 741 (1985); State v. Pridgen, 313 N.C. 80, 326 S.E.2d 618
(1985); State v. Freeman, 313 N.C. 539, 330 S.E.2d 465 (1985);
State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516 (1985); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1,
320 S.E.2d 642 (1984); State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d
110 (1984); State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984);
State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 324 S.E.2d 250 (1985); State v.
Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hannah, 312
N.C. 286, 322 S.E.2d 148 (1984); State v. McCray, 312 N.C. 512,
324 S.E.2d 606 (1985); State v. Payne, 312 N.C. 647, 325 S.E.2d
205 (1985); State v. Harold, 312 N.C. 787, 325 S.E.2d 219 (1985);
State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984); State v. Mc-
Donald, 312 N.C. 264, 321 S.E.2d 849 (1984); State v. Jenkins, 311
N.C. 194, 317 S.E.2d 345 (1984); State v. Beal, 311 N.C. 555, 319
S.E.2d 557 (1984); State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591
(1984); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v.
Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311
N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984); State v. Withers, 311 N.C. 699, 319
S.E.2d 211 (1984); State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46
(1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984); State
v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 312 S.E.2d 393 (1984); State v. Adcock,
310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1984); State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40,,311
S.E.2d 540 (1984); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 254, 311 S.E.2d 256
(1984); State v. Baugus, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248 (1984); State
v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984); State v. Heptin-
stall, 309 N.C. 231, 306 S.E.2d 109 (1983); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C.
326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (as to Defendant Oliver's sentence for
the murder of Hodge); State v Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309
S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703
(1983); State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 305 S.E.2d 685 (1983); State v.
Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983); State v. Abdullah, 309
N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983); State v. Martin and Brown, 309
N.C. 465, 308 S.E.2d 277 (1983); State v. Booker, 309 N.C. 446, 306
S.E.2d 771 (1983); State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 302 S.E.2d 164
19851
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(1983); State v. Whisenant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983);
State v. Douglas Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983);
State v. Craig and Anthony, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740 (1983);
State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983); State v.
Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983); State v. Franklin, 308
N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983); State v. Barnett, 307 N.C. 608,
300 S.E.2d 340 (1983); State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 300 S.E.2d 366
(1983); State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1983); State
v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982); State v. David Brown,
306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569 (1982); State V. Larry Williams, 305
N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292
S.E.2d 264 (1982); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574
(1982); State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982); State v.
Brock, 305 N.C. 532, 290 S.E.2d 556 (1982); State v. Fox, 305 N.C.
280, 287 S.E.2d 887 (1982); State v. Lake, 305 N.C. 143, 286 S.E.2d
541 (1982); State v. Marshall, 304 N.C. 67, 282 S.E.2d 422 (1981);
State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981); State v. Rook,
304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981); State v. Norwood, 303 N.C.
473, 279 S.E.2d 550 (1981); State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 278
S.E.2d 200 (1981); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410
(1981); State v. Cohen, 301 N.C. 220, 270 S.E.2d 416 (1980); State
v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980); State v. Avery,
299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C.
321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278
S.E.2d 214 (1981); State v. Adcox, 303 N.C. 133, 277 S.E.2d 398
(1981); State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 273 (1981); State v.
Williams, 302 N.C. 572, 276 S.E.2d 417 (1981); State v. Hawkins,
302 N.C. 364, 275 S.E.2d 172 (1981); State v. Dharlene Moore, 301
N.C. 262, 271 S.E.2d 242 (1980); State v. Crawford, 301 N.C. 212,
270 S.E.2d 102 (1980); State v. Smith, 301 N.C. 695, 272 S.E.2d 852
(1980); State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980); State v.
Clark, 301 N.C. 176, 270 S.E.2d 425 (1980); State v. Small, 301
N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980); State v. Weimer, 300 N.C. 642,
268 S.E.2d 216 (1980); State v. Clark, 300 N.C. 16, 265 S.E.2d 204
(1980); State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980); State v.
McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286 (1980); State v. Powell,
299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1979); State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671,
263 S.E.2d 768 (1980); State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E.2d
745 (1980); State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 259 S.E.2d 227 (1979);
State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979); State v.
Ferdinando, 298 N.C. 737, 260 S.E.2d 423 (1979); State v. Barfield,
298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979); State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607,
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252 S.E.2d 745 (1979); State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d
263 (1979).
The following cases are not includable in the pool under the
criteria in State v. Douglas Williams, supra, because they were
found to contain errors and were remanded either for a new trial as
to guilt or for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Peacock, 313 N.C.
554, 330 S.E.2d 190 (1985); State v. Flack, 312 N.C. 448, 322 S.E.2d
758 (1984); State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 313 S.E.2d 507 (1984);
State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 310 S.E.2d 20 (1984); State v. Bates,
309 N.C. 528, 308 S.E.2d 258 (1983); State v. Myers, 309 N.C. 78,
305 S.E.2d 506 (1983); State v. Oliver and Moore, 309 N.C. 326,
307 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (as to both defendants role in the murder of
Watts); State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 304 S.E.2d 184 (1983); State
v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983); State v. Strick-
land, 307 N.C. 274, 298 S.E.2d 645 (1983); State v. Larry Williams,
304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437 (1981); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93,
282 S.E.2d 439 (1981); State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 279 S.E.2d
570 (1981); State v. Corn, 303 N.C. 293, 278 S.E.2d 221 (1981);
State v. Hamlette, 302 N.C. 490, 276 S.E.2d 338 (1981); State v.
Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981); State v. Oliver and
Moore I, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981) (as to both defendants
for both murders); State v. Ward, 300 N.C. 150, 266 S.E.2d 581
(1980); State v. Poole, 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E.2d 339 (1979); State v.
Johnson I, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979); State v. Johnson II,
298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C.
149, 257 S.E.2d 391 (1979); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257
S.E.2d 551 (1979); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569
(1979); State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979).
Finally, the following cases are not included in the pool be-
cause no sentencing hearing was conducted, pursuant to the rule in
State v. Johnson II, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979), that a
sentencing hearing will be conducted only where there is evidence
sufficient to establish at least one of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e). State v. Av-
ery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1986); State v. Mize, 315 N.C. 285,
337 S.E.2d 562 (1985); State v. Braswsell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d
241 (1985); State v. Walden, 311 N.C. 667, 319 S.E.2d 577 (1984);
State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 319 S.E.2d 584 (1984); State v.
Taylor, 311 N.C. 266, 316 S.E.2d 225 (1984); State v. Watson, 310
N.C. 384, 312 S.E.2d 448 (1984); State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 279, 307
S.E.2d 551 (1983); State v. Judge, 308 N.C. 658, 303 S.E.2d 817
(1983); State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 300 S.E.2d 366 (1983); State
1985]
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v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 298 S.E.2d 631 (1983); State v. Howard,
305 N.C. 651, 290 S.E.2d 591 (1982); State v. Mash, 305 N.C. 285,
287 S.E.2d 824 (1982); State v. Murvin, 304 N.C. 523, 284 S.E.2d
289 (1981); State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 291 S.E.2d 622 (1982);
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